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EMPLOYMENT LAW-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-NEG-
LIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS--The United States
Supreme Court held that negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress is a cognizable injury under the Federal Employers' Liabili-
ty Act provided that the employee satisfies the elements of the
common law zone-of-danger test.
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
James Gottshall ("Gottshall") was a member of a Consolidated
Rail ("Conrail") crew that was ordered to replace a stretch of
defective track.' Because the workcrew was under time pressure
to finish the project, the crew was discourajed from taking
scheduled breaks.2 Approximately two hours into the job, a
worker, Richard Johns, collapsed.3 Gottshall and several others
revived the worker, but the crew supervisor then ordered the
men to stop assisting Johns and to immediately resume work-
ing.4
About five minutes later, Gottshall again went to his
coworker's aid after seeing Johns collapse a second time.5 While
Gottshall administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the su-
pervisor attempted unsuccessfully to reach assistance on his
radio.' The supervisor left the site in search of medical assis-
tance.7 Before the supervisor returned with paramedics, Johns
had died.' Johns' body remained at the worksite covered with a
sheet in plain view of the workers, as the workcrew was ordered
to return to work.9 Gottshall was institutionalized shortly after
1. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 2400 (1994). The
weather was very hot and humid. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2400.
2. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2400.
3. Id.
4. Id. The workmen were able to revive Johns by administering a cold com-
press. Id. Johns had been sweating profusely and was pale. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is "the reestablishing of heart and
lung action as indicated for cardiac arrest or apparent sudden death resulting from
electric shock, drowning, respiratory arrest, and other causes." THE SLOANE-DORLAND
ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 616 (1st ed. 1987).
7. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct, at 2400-01.
8. Id. at 2401.
9. Id. The coroner's report stated that Johns died from a heart attack caused
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Johns' death because of various psychological disorders."0
Gottshall then brought suit against Conrail under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.1 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the district'court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Con-
rail and remanded the case for trial. 2 In remanding the case,
the Third Circuit utilized a liberal construction of FELA and
adopted the genuineness of injury approach as the proper test
for claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress brought
under FELA.3 The Third Circuit's test included two parts.
First, the test focused on whether the plaintiff suffered a serious
and genuine injury based on a totality of factors." Second, the
usual FELA elements of duty, breach of duty, injury, and causa-
tion had to be met in order to allege a prima facie case under
FELA. s Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that genuine issues
of material fact existed regarding whether Gottshall suffered a
cognizable injury from the events surrounding Johns' death."6
In a separate case, respondent Carlisle brought suit under
FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress." Carlisle
by "heat, humidity, and heavy exertion." Id.
10. Id. It was determined that Gottshall suffered from "major depression and
post-traumatic stress disorder." Id. Depression is defined as "a psychiatric syndrome
consisting of dejected mood, psychomotor retardation, insomnia, and weight loss."
THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 191 (1st ed. 1987).
Post-traumatic stress disorder "is a term used to describe the patient who continues
to reexperience a traumatic event, resulting in significant kinds of distress." Id. at
221. Gottshall suffered from "nausea, insomnia, cold sweats, and repetitive night-
mares" after Johns' death. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2401.
11. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2401. The Court contended that
negligent infliction of emotional distress generally referred to emotional harm caused
by the negligence of another and normally was not brought about by a -physical
injury. Id. at 2405. The Federal Employer's Liability Act, enacted in 1908, provides
in part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of
the several states . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in commerce . . resulting in
whole or part from . . . such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficien-
cy, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, tract,
roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
12. Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994).
13. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 371. The court of appeals contended that "the issue
is whether the factual circumstances here provide a threshold assurance that there
is a likelihood of genuine and serious emotional injury." Id.
14. Id. The factors included examining the claim in light of common law de-
velopments in the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.
15. Id. at 375.
16. Id. at 379.
17. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2402.
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claimed that Conrail breached its duty of care under FELA and
caused him to suffer emotional injury by assigning him to stress-
ful working conditions."5 On appeal before the Third Circuit,
the court affirmed the district court's $386,500 .damage award in
favor of Carlisle. 9 In affirming, the court restated its two-prong
test set forth in Gottshall and held that an employer could be
held liable when it was foreseeable that injuries would result
from exposure to stressful working conditions.2" Thus, the
Third Circuit concluded that Conrail had breached its duty of
care by failing to provide Carlisle with a safe place of employ-
ment.21
The Supreme Court granted Conrail's petition for certiorari to
settle the split among the circuit courts over the proper thresh-
old test to determine negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims under FELA.22
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, asserted that the
issue before the Court was whether FELA included recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and if so, what recov-
ery was available.23 The Court noted that FELA was designed
to afford a remedy to workers who suffered injuries resulting
from accidents on interstate railroads, and that the statute had
been liberally construed to further these remedial goals. 4 The
Court also contended that to impose liability under the statute,
the plaintiff had to establish negligence, not merely the exis-
tence of injuries.25 In addition, the Court emphasized that
FELA was grounded in common law principles and because
FELA was silent on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, common law principles were determinative in FELA's
application to the current case.2"
The majority asserted that the injury in a negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim was mental or emotional harm
caused by the negligence of another not directly brought about
by a physical injury.27 The Court further noted that nearly all
states have recognized a right to recover for negligent infliction
18. Id. The alleged working conditions included extended shifts as well as
overburdensome duties. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2402-03.
21. Id. at 2403.
22. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2403.
23. Id. Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Ginsburg wrote
a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Id.
24. Id. at 2403-04.
25. Id. at 2404.
26. Id.
27. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2405.
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of emotional distress." The majority also recognized the poten-
tial of unpredictable and infinite liability if an action for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claims existed under
FELA.29 Finally, the Court reviewed the three major common
law threshold tests for limiting negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims.30
Deciding the issue of whether claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress were actionable under FELA, the Court
agreed with the Third Circuit's holding that such claims were
cognizable.3 The Court held that a railroad's duty under FELA
included protecting its workers from negligently inflicted emo-
tional harm and injury.2 The majority, however, rejected the
Third Circuit's "genuineness" threshold test because the test
failed to rely on common law principles.33 The Court concluded
that determining injury based upon "genuineness" could lead to
unpredictable liability for defendants. 4 According to the Court,
the common law had effectively eliminated the possibility of
infinite liability from a single instance of negligent conduct.3"
In deciding the proper scope of recovery under FELA for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, the Court selected the zone-
of-danger test.3" The Court reasoned that the zone-of-danger
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2406-07. The Court first concluded that to recover under the physi-
cal impact test, the plaintiff had to endure either a physical injury or impact to
recover for emotional distress. Id. at 2406. Second, the Court determined that to
recover under the zone-of-danger test, a plaintiff had to either be physically impact-
ed or injured or be in a position of immediate and imminent physical injury. Id.
Finally, the Court found that to recover under the bystander rule, a plaintiff had to:
be located near the scene of the accident, suffer emotional shock from witnessing the
accident, and be closely related to the person suffering injury in the accident. Id. at
2407.
31. Id. at 2407. The Court concluded that in the past it had accorded broad
scope to the statutory term "injury" in light of FELA's remedial purposes, and per-
mitting recovery for emotional injury was consistent with its prior decisions. Id. at
2407-08.
32. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2408.
33. Id.
34. Id. The Court also criticized the "genuineness" of injury approach because
it did not diminish the possibility of infinite liability, and the Court noted that the
test could lead to haphazard results, leaving employers with no standard by which
to regulate their conduct. Id. at 2409.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2410. The Court held that a worker within the zone of danger could
recover for emotional injury caused by the fear of physical peril and further asserted
that workers could recover for both physical and- emotional injuries if the negligent
conduct of their employers threatened them with imminent physical impact. Id. at
2411. The majority contended that the zone-of-danger test had been adopted by four-
teen jurisdictions. Id. The Court concluded that the zone-of-danger test was fully
consistent with the Court's understanding of the statute. Id. at 2409.
1096
Recent Decisions
test was a well established common law concept of negligence
that was suitable to determine what constituted negligence for
purposes of FELA.37 Lastly, the Court concluded that the zone-
of-danger test was harmonious with FELA's major concern of
protecting workers from injuries resulting from physical per-
ils.
38
The Court remanded Gottshall for reconsideration under the
zone-of-danger test.3' The Court also remanded Carlisle with
instructions to enter judgment for Conrail because, the Court
asserted, that Carlisle's work-related-stress claim plainly did not
fall within the common law's conception of the zone of danger.'
The majority therefore concluded that the Third Circuit applied
an erroneous standard under both cases for evaluating claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress brought under
FELA and reversed the judgments below.41
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which he expand-
ed on the Court's duty in interpreting FELA and concluded that
the zone-of-danger test was the proper threshold test for deter-
mining liability under FELA for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.42
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined, dissented.4 3 The dissent first addressed the limited
scope of the railroad's liability because of the zone-of-danger
test." The dissent determined that the majority's concern over
the prospect of infinite liability should not control in the context
of FELA because the class of potential plaintiffs under FELA
was not the public at large. 5 Instead, the dissent explained
that the rationale used by the Third Circuit in Gottshall and
Carlisle was proper." The dissent asserted that both Gottshall
and Carlisle suffered severe injuries on the job as a result of
37. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2410.
38. Id. The Court dismissed the physical impact test based on its lack of sup-
port in the common law as well as its overly limited application. Id. at 2411. Justice
Thomas also ruled out the bystander test because the test could only be used in the
rare instances when a worker witnessed a railroad accident involving a relative. Id.
39. Id. The question of whether Gottshall met the elements of the zone-of-
danger test was not adequately briefed or argued before the Court. Id.
40. Id. at 2411-12.
41. Id. at 2411.
42. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2412 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice
Souter explained that the Court's duty in examining claims under FELA was to
generate a federal common law of what exactly constitutes negligence under the
statute. Id.
43. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id.




The dissent then addressed the majority's three justifications
for its adoption of the zone-of-danger test." The dissent
contended that the zone-of-danger test and its use in only four-
teen states illustrated that the test was not even the test em-
ployed by the majority of the states. 9 Moreover, because Con-
gress intended FELA to be construed broadly, physical perils
wrongfully limited the scope of the term "injury" in the statute
and thus foreclosed the remedial intent of Congress in writing
the statute." Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's prima-
ry concern of unlimited liability by concluding that the universe
of potential FELA plaintiffs was hardly infinite, and that the ap-
propriate FELA threshold should be the genuineness and gravi-
ty of the worker's injury.51 The dissent concluded that the Third
Circuit's "genuineness of injury" approach was the appropriate
standard to be taken under FELA and therefore concluded that
the court of appeals' judgments should have been affirmed.52
Tracing the development of the common law in the area of
negligent infliction of emotional distress is necessary to under-
stand the Court's holding in Consolidated Rail Corp. The tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress generally refers to a
defendant who negligently causes a plaintiff to suffer mental or
emotional harm that is not directly brought about by a physical
injury." At early common law, however, recovery under the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress was very limited. In
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., ' the Court of Appeals of
New York adopted the rule that mental disturbance alone could
47. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48. Id. The three justifications were: the firm roots of the test in the common
law; the test's consistency with FELA's central focus on physical perils; and the test
best controlled the majority's fear of infinite liability to an infinite number of per-
sons. Id.
49. Id. In addition, the dissent noted that the majority never decided the
point from which to evaluate the support the different common law rules have en-
joyed. Id.
50. Id. at 2418.
51. Id.
52. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2419 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. See Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2405. While no specific defini-
tion of emotional distress was used throughout the common law, the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress has generally been regarded as a tort involving
a defendant breaching a duty owed to the plaintiff based on the plaintiffs right to
be free from mental disturbance. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 53 (5th ed. 1984).




not sustain a cause of action based on negligence." In Mitchell,
the plaintiff brought suit after suffering a miscarriage. 6 The
Court considered whether a plaintiff could recover for mental
distress when the plaintiff had not been physically injured.57
The court held that no recovery was available under a theory of
negligent infliction of emotional distress for injuries sustained
by fright, absent a contemporaneous physical injury.58 The
court reasoned that to establish any other doctrine would be
contrary to public policy, and would open a wide field of ficti-
tious or speculative claims.5 9 In so holding, the Court of Ap-
peals of New York had created the physical impact test.60
In 1892, in Purcell v. St. Paul Railway Co.," the Supreme
Court of Minnesota was presented with the issue of whether a
cable car passenger could recover for purely emotional injuries
caused by the fear of imminent peril.6 2 The passenger brought
suit against the defendant cable car company for nervous con-
vulsions and illness due to the defendant's negligent operation of
the cable car." The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that if
the negligence of a carrier placed a passenger in a position of
such apparent imminent peril as to cause fright, and the fright
caused illness, the defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, and the injury was actionable."
55. Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 354.
56. Id. The miscarriage had been caused when a horse car belonging to the
defendant approached and almost ran the plaintiff over while she had been waiting
to board one of the defendant's trains. Id. As a result of her fright and excitement,
the plaintiff became unconscious and suffered the miscarriage and consequent illness.
Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 354-55. The Mitchell court relied on several policy concerns for dis-
allowing purely emotional injury recovery including an expected flood of litigation;
the risk of an overflow of fraudulent claims; and exposing defendants to potentially
unlimited liability. Id. at 355. At the time FELA was enacted, most of the major
industrial states had embraced the physical impact test. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
114 S. Ct. at 2406.
59. Mitchell, 45 N.E. at 355.
60. See Douglas Marlowe, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Juris.
dictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of
Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 783-86 (1988).
61. 50 N.W. 1034 (Minn. 1892).
62. Purcell, 50 N.W. at 1034. The passenger was riding on one of defendant's
cable cars when the cable car approached an intersection and nearly collided with
another approaching cable car. Id.
63. Id. The passenger had appealed from an order overruling a general de-
murrer to the complaint. Id.
64. Id. The defendant contended that the plaintiffs emotional injuries were
caused by her pregnancy, and not by the defendant's negligence. Id. at 1035. The
court, however, noted that anyone in her position, pregnant or not, could have sus-
tained the same injuries. Id. at 1035.
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The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs fright was
caused solely by the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff
met the test of being placed in a position of imminent peril.'
The test used by the court became known as the "zone-of-dan-
ger" test which allowed emotional injury recovery to plaintiffs
who sustained a physical impact or who were placed in immedi-
ate risk of physical impact or harm.'
In 1908 Congress enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA" or the "Act").6  FELA was enacted to provide compen-
sation for railway employees who suffered job-related injuries
caused by the negligence of their employer." Eliminating tradi-
tional tort defenses as well as fostering recovery for meritorious
cases were among the primary purposes of the Act.'
Although the Supreme Court would not address the issue of
negligent infliction of emotional distress under FELA for almost
eighty years, in 1949, the Court noted the importance of the
common law in interpreting and construing FELA in Urie v.
Thompson.' In Urie, the issue was whether FELA covered oc-
cupational diseases.7 The petitioner had been employed as a
fireman on steam locomotives for thirty years, and in 1940, he
had been forced to cease work because of a pulmonary dis-
ease.72 The Court determined that the railroad contributed to
petitioner's injury by negligently creating the hazardous condi-
tions.73 The Court further noted that common law principles as
established and applied in federal courts would determine what
was an actionable "injury" within FELA.74
The third common law test for determining negligent infliction
of emotional distress claims was enunciated by the Supreme
65. Id. By restricting emotional injury recovery to those in apparent imminent
danger of impact, the Supreme Court had established what later would be referred
to in the common law as the "zone-of-danger" test.
66. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2406. See generally Marlowe, cited
at note 60, at 794.
67. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908). The original enactment was struck down on the
ground that it applied to intrastate as well as interstate commerce. See Howard v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908).
68. Carlisle, 990 F.2d at 93.
69. See Buell, 480 U.S. at 561.
70. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
71. Urie, 337 U.S. at 165.
72. Id. Specifically, the petitioner was diagnosed with silicosis, a permanently
disabling affliction caused by continuous inhalation of silica dust blown or sucked
into the cabs of the locomotives on which he had worked. Id. at 165-66.
73. Id. at 175.
74. Id. at 174. The Court opined that FELA did not define negligence, leaving
that question to be determined by common law standards. Id.
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Court of California in Dillon v. Legg.7" In Dillon, a negligent
operator of an automobile struck and killed a young girl as the
mother of the girl observed the accident from a safe distance."6
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and determined that the plaintiff had not sufficiently
alleged a cause of action based upon emotional shock and physi-
cal injury."
Before the Supreme Court of California, the issue was wheth-
er an emotional injury sustained by a bystander outside the zone
of danger was a foreseeable consequence of a defendant's negli-
gent actions. 8 The court asserted that there were three factors
to be considered in determining the question of foreseeability of
injury.79 First, the plaintiff had to be located near the scene of
the accident. ° Second, the plaintiffs shock had to result from a
direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident.81 Third, the plain-
tiff and victim had to be closely related in order for the injury to
be deemed foreseeable and thus a recoverable injury.8" The
court determined that an evaluation of these factors indicated
the degree of the defendant's foreseeability." The court con-
cluded that because all three factors were present, the plaintiff
had alleged a prima facie case.'
The Supreme Court did not address negligent infliction of
emotional distress under FELA until 1987 in Atchinson, Topeka
& Sante Fe Railway Co. v. Buell.5 In Buell, the respondent was
a carman employed by the petitioner.' The respondent filed a
FELA complaint in federal district court, alleging that he had
suffered severe personal injuries as a result of the petitioner's
failure to provide him with a safe workplace. 7 The petitioner
75. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
76. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914. The plaintiff sustained emotional disturbance and
shock and injury to her nervous system which in turn caused her physical and men-
tal pain and suffering. Id. The plaintiffs other daughter was in the zone of danger
and was allowed to recover for her emotional injuries. Id. at 914-15.
77. Id. The plaintiff then appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme
Court of California. Id.
78. Id. at 920.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 920-21.
84. Id. at 921. Many states currently follow the bystander rule as announced
in Dillon. See Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2407 n.10 (citations omitted).
85. 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
86. Buell, 480 U.S. at 559.
87. Id. The respondent claimed that his workplace was not safe because fellow
1995 1101
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contended that the respondent's sole. remedy was through the
Railway Labor Act.' The issue before the Court was whether
the intentional and negligent actions of an employer had caused
the employee to suffer emotional injuries and therefore were
actionable under FELA. 5 The Supreme Court did not reach the
issue of whether a purely emotional injury was cognizable under
FELA, but stressed that FELA, not the Railway Labor Act, con-
trolled the inquiry."
The Court asserted that whether an emotional injury was
cognizable under FELA could only be answered on an ad hoc
basis.91 The Court advised the federal courts that when dealing
with the issue of emotional injury recovery under the Act, the
common law development of negligent infliction of emotional
distress had to be utilized.92 However, because the facts of the
record were not adequately developed in Buell, the Court re-
manded the case."
Just months after the Buell decision, in Moody v. Maine Cen-
tral Railroad," the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also
did not reach the issue of whether purely emotional injuries
were cognizable under FELA.9" In Moody, the appellant
brought an action against the appellee under FELA and claimed
the railroad had negligently injured the appellant." The issue
employees harassed, threatened and intimidated him while on the job. Id.
88. Id. at 562-63. The petitioner filed an answer and asserted that the
respondent's sole remedy was before the National Railroad Adjustment Board pursu-
ant to the Railway Labor Act which established elaborate administrative procedures
for the resolution of both minor and major labor disputes. Id. The Railway Labor
Act did not mention FELA or the subject of tort liability. Id. at 562.
89. Id. at 559. The trial court granted summary judgment for the petitioner,
and the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded after deciding that FELA authorized
recovery for emotional injury. Id. at 560.
90. Id. at 566. The Court asserted that Congress's enactment of the Railway
Labor Act did not affect a worker's right to damages under FELA. Id.
91. Buell, 480 U.S. at 568.
92. Id. The Supreme Court also noted that even though many states now
recognized the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, they varied in the
degree of "objective symptomatology" the victim had to demonstrate. Id. at 569-70.
The Court also stressed that "broad pronouncements in this area may have to bow
to the precise application of developing legal principles to the particular facts at
hand." Id. at 570.
93. Id.
94. 823 F.2d 693 (lst Cir. 1987).
95. Moody, 823 F.2d at 694. The First Circuit noted that, despite the Supreme
Court's dictum in Buell, it would not utilize this case to determine whether FELA
permitted a cause of action for emotional injury. Id.
96. Id. at 693. The appellant alleged that he was denied admission into engi-
neering training, denied qualification on certain rune, assigned to unattractive loca-
tions, and alleged that it was suggested that no future employees like the appellant
should be selected for training and advancement. Id. The injuries that the appellant
1102
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was whether the employee had established a causal connection
between his condition and the conduct of the railroad to enable
the employee to recover under FELA."7 The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor
of the appellee." The circuit court concluded that although the
Buell opinion did not completely reject recovery for wholly emo-
tional injury, there was nothing in the record to indicate that
the proximate cause of appellant's injuries was a genuine ques-
tion of material fact.w
In 1990, the Third Circuit elaborated on the type of injury
included within a FEIA action in Holliday v. Consolidated Rail
Corp.'s In Holliday, the appellant was a railroad worker who
was informed that he would be held out of service until he quali-
fied as a conductor. 1' The appellant filed suit under FELA al-
leging he was injured due to the appellee's negligence in placing
the appellant in a position that he claimed was beyond his quali-
fications. °2 The issue was whether the stress and resultant
physical conditions that the appellant suffered was an injury
within the meaning of FELA. °3 The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the placement of the appellant in a position in
which he was unqualified, combined with a lack of direct, physi-
alleged included depression and fatigue which resulted in attacks of angina. Id.
Angina is defined as "spasmodic, choking, or suffocative pain." THE SLOANE-DORLAND
ANNOTATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 35 (1st ed. 1987). The trial court found an ade-
quate basis for granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that appellant had failed to make a sufficient showing of causation between the
alleged injuries and the actions of the appellee. Moody, 823 F.2d at 694.
97. Moody, 823 F.2d at 696.
98. Id. at.694-95.
99. Id. The court of appeals found that although there were references to
eight doctors, there was no evidence that any of the doctors indicated that the pur-
ported harassment was the cause of any symptom exhibited by appellant. Id. at 695.
100. 914 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1990).
101. Holiday, 914 F.2d at 421. A conductor is in charge of trains and must be
familiar with the physical characteristics of the lines on which he works. Id. at 421-
22. In order to qualify as a conductor, the appellant worked various lines with a
pilot, and began working without a pilot as a conductor in a short time. Id. at 422.
A pilot is an engineer who helps another engineer operate a train over track that
the engineer is unacquainted with. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIO-
NARY 1716 (3d ed. 1986). The appellant never became familiar with the lines or the
switching thereon, nor did the appellant receive the proper notation that he was a
qualified conductor as he continued to work as a conductor without a pilot. Holliday,
914 F.2d at 422. The stress of the job affected the appellant as he began to experi-
ence sleep disorder, anxiety, depression, involuntary rectal discharge and nightmares
of train wrecks and injuries. Id. The court noted that evidence existed to establish
that his physical problems and psychological disorders were attributable to his fear
of causing an accident and of being physically injured. Id.
102. Id. at 422. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
appellee without an opinion and the appellant appealed. id.
103. Id.
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cal impact on his person could not support recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress under FELA.' 4 The court of ap-
peals concluded that although no recovery was afforded in this
case, emotional injury recovery under FELA could be available
depending on the circumstances." 5
After several of the circuit courts declined to decide whether a
wholly emotional injury was cognizable under FELA, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals was the next circuit court to examine
the issue in the context of emotional injury recovery under the
Jones Act. °6 In 1991, the Fifth Circuit was given the opportu-
nity to decide a purely emotional injury claim brought under the
FELA-based Jones Act in Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc."7  In
Plaisance, the appellant brought suit under the Jones Act for
emotional injuries he alleged occurred in an explosion." 8 The
Fifth Circuit held that a claim for an emotional injury caused by
negligently inflicted emotional distress, even without an accom-
panying physical impact, was cognizable under both FELA and
104. Id. at 427. The court concluded that the appellant was actually in an
unqualified position for a few days. Id.
105. Id. at 426-27. The court opined that the issue of whether purely emotional
injuries were recoverable under FELA was not reached from the facts given in the
case. id. at 427.
106. The Jones Act provides in relevant part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law . . . and in such
action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply; and in case of death of any seaman as a result of any such personal
injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for
damages at law . . . and in such action all statutes of the United States con-
ferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway em-
ployees shall be applicable.
46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1991).
107. 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991), affd, 966 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
bancj, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992).
108. Plaisance, 937 F.2d at 1005. The appellant had been a tugboat captain for
thirty years. Id. The second tug, tied to the barge, struck an underwater gas pipe-
line, and the pipeline ruptured and an explosion and fire ensued. Id. After the ex-
plosion, the appellant immediately backed up to the barge, and the workers on the
barge and the crew of the second tug were quickly moved to the safety of the
appellant's tugboat. Id. The court found that the fire was confined to the rear of the
barge and the front of the trailing tug. Id. The fire was extinguished by the crews,
and the entire operation took less than thirty minutes. Id. No one suffered injuries
by the fire or the explosion. Id. A few hours later, the appellant asked to be re-
lieved of his duty because he did not feel well. Id. Subsequently, the appellant went
to a hospital for a few days and was later transferred to a psychiatric hospital
where he spent forty-five' days. Id. The appellant was diagnosed as suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder and depression resulting from his perception that he
and the others could have been killed or injured in the explosion. Id. at 1006-07.
The appellant's emotional injury claims under the Jones Act were dismissed by the
trial court and the appellant appealed. Id. at 1006.
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the Jones Act.' The court adopted the full recovery rule,
which allowed a general negligence cause of action for the inflic-
tion of emotional distress."" The court reasoned that the possi-
bility of false claims and other policy considerations should not
prevent recovery in all situations in which a person had suffered
a consequential emotional injury."' The court concluded that
the district court properly dismissed the appellant's complaint
on the basis that one could not reasonably expect an ordinary
seaman to have the emotional reaction alleged by the appel-
lant."2
Since the late nineteenth century plaintiffs have been able to
recover for emotional injuries provided they have suffered a
physical impact or have been within the zone-of-danger."3 In
1908, FELA was adopted for railroad workers to recover for
injuries sustained from the negligence of their employer."" As
the common law continued to evolve in the area of negligent
infliction of emotional distress by recognizing bystander recovery
as early as the late 1960's, no claims for distress had been
brought. It was not until 1987, in Buell, that the Supreme Court
of the United States first addressed the issue of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress recovery under FELA. Thus, as the
common law developed rules and guidelines for recovery for
purely emotional injuries, FELA lagged behind the common law
in addressing claims and developing a federal common law per-
taining to purely emotional injury recovery.
109. Id. at 1009.
110. Id. at 1010. The court of appeals explained that the claimed emotional in-
jury had to occur from a situation in which a reasonable person, normally constitut-
ed, would not be able to adequately cope with the mental distress resulting from the
circumstances. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1011. The final ruling on the appellants claim, however, did not
occur until the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the court's own motion, determined
to rehear the case en banc. See Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 954 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.
1992). The term "en banc" generally "refers to a session where the entire member-
ship of the court will participate in the decision rather than the regular panel of
judges." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990). The court asserted that it took
the case en banc to consider whether the facts were appropriate for establishing a
rule for the recovery of purely emotional injuries under the Jones Act. Plaisance v.
Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Sitting en banc, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the appellant's case.
Plaisance, 966 F.2d at 169. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the facts of the case did not permit the court to decide whether or under what cir-
cumstances it might permit recovery of damages for purely emotional injuries. Id. In
dicta, the court of appeals thus rejected the use of the full recovery rule in the
FELA/Jones Act context. Id.
113. See Purcell v. St. Paul Ry. Co., 50 N.W. 1034 (Minn. 1892).
114. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).
1995 1105
Duquesne Law Review
To analyze the Supreme Court's holding in Consolidated Rail
Corp., it is important to understand the type of relief that the
respondents requested and the limited scope of the Court's hold-
ing. The respondents, Carlisle and Gottshall, claimed Conrail
was at fault for the negligent infliction of emotional distress on
their person. ' The Court held that negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress was a cognizable injury under FELA."5 The
Court adopted, without finding a prima facie case, the common
law zone-of-danger threshold test for determining whether a
claim was meritorious.m
In adopting the zone-of-danger test, the Court reviewed not
only the policy reasons behind limiting recovery for emotional
distress claims in general, but also the three major common law
threshold tests."' The court concluded that the zone-of-danger
test remained a well-established common law concept of negli-
gence based on its current use in fourteen jurisdictions." ' In
addition, the Court viewed the test as consistent with both
FELA's focus on physical perils, and its remedial and broad
approach to recovery. However, by using the zone-of-danger test
to restrict claims, the Court did not further FELA's broad and
remedial purpose.
The Court noted that in the past it had accorded broad scope
to the term "injury" in light of FELA's remedial purpose.' 0 The
Court acknowledged that the zone-of-danger test was arbitrary
yet contended it was in best accord with the concerns that had
motivated FELA jurisprudence. 2' However, this arbitrary and
restrictive test is not in best accord with the liberal and remedi-
al policies behind FELA jurisprudence.
The Court accepted the zone-of-danger test perhaps because
the common law normally only recognized claims for negligently
inflicted emotional injury brought by a plaintiff who met either
the physical impact, zone-of-danger, or bystander tests.'22 Be-
cause the physical impact test is the most restrictive and the
bystander rule is virtually inapplicable to situations under
115. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2401-02.
116. Id. at 2408-09.
117. Id. at 2410. Because of the limited reach of the zone-of-danger test, the
Court remanded Carlisle's case to have judgment entered for Conrail and remanded
Gottshall's case to be reheard under the Court's instructions. Id. at 2411-12.
118. Id. at 2406-07.
119. Id. at 2410.
120. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2407.
121. Id. at 2411.
122. The fourth and most liberal threshold test not mentioned by the Court is
the full recovery rule. See Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991),
affd, 966 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992).
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FELA, the adoption of the zone-of-danger test may reflect the
most liberal test the court could have adopted.'23
The dissenting opinion provides the Court with an alternative
to choosing one of the three major common law tests by conclud-
ing that fraudulent claims could be properly restricted by. the
Third Circuit's genuineness of injury approach. 2' The dissent
maintained that the threshold test under FELA should focus on
the genuineness as well as the gravity of the alleged injury.2 5
Justice Ginsburg explained that the Third Circuit's approach
provides a threshold assurance of genuine emotional injury.2
The dissent concentrated on the principle that FELA imposed
upon carriers a higher standard of conduct and had eliminated
many of the common law bars to recovery.'27 As the dissent
pointed out, the zone-of-danger test was inappropriate for a
federal statute designed to govern the discrete category of on-
the-job injuries sustained by railroad workers. ' There is not a
strong correlation between a broad, remedial statute like FELA
and the Court's deference to the very restrictive zone-of-danger
test.
The Third Circuit's "genuineness" of injury test would provide
plaintiffs with a test that is consistent with the broad and reme-
dial policies behind FELA.2 9 The goal of every threshold test is
to limit recovery to meritorious claims. This goal is better served
by using an objective test, like the Third Circuit's genuineness of
injury test or the short lived Fifth Circuit's full recovery rule. By
selecting an arbitrary and limiting test, meritorious claims will
be precluded.
123. At the same time, it is possible the Court was somewhat pressured into
making an affirmative decision on the issue due to the split of authority throughout
the various circuits concerning negligent infliction of emotional distress recovery
under FELA. However, the full recovery rule, never mentioned by the Court, could
possibly be the best solution of all: a liberal, yet uniform, threshold for recovery.
124. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2419 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2419.
126. Id. at 2419. The dissent concluded that the Third Circuit had developed
the appropriate FELA common-law approach. Id.
127. Id. at 2414. Section 5 of FELA provides in part, "[any contract, rule,
regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable
any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall
to that extent be void." 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1988). FELA also eliminated the defense of
contributory negligence. 45 U.S.C. § 53. Also, FELA eliminated the defense of as-
sumption of the risk. Id. § 54.
128. Consolidated Rail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2418.
129. See Christopher M. Shields, Note, Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail Corp. and
Justice Ginsburg's Dissent: Striking An Equitable Compromise Between The Interests
of Labor and Management Regarding FELA Liability For Work.Related Stress, 39
VILL. L. REV. 197 (1994).
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Without question, there is considerable justification for adopt-
ing the zone-of-danger test. The zone-of-danger test provides
uniformity and stability throughout the various circuits. Howev-
er, the significant discretion given to lower federal courts in
finding negligence under FELA has been taken away by the
Supreme Court. Future federal courts will be forced to throw out
many meritorious cases that do not fit the highly selective ele-
ments of the zone-of-danger test. In the wake of Consolidated
Rail Corp., the future of emotional distress claims under FELA
will be unnecessarily restricted. This restrictive future for FELA
claims clearly contradicts the liberal and remedial policies of
FELA.
In conclusion, the selection of the zone-of-danger test will
provide uniformity for recovery under FELA at a major cost to
workers protected under FELA. Also, it is easy to predict that
most future complaints brought under FELA for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress will fail to survive a motion for sum-
mary judgment. With this predictable future in mind, the Su-
preme Court missed a rare opportunity to emulate the spirit of
liberal recovery under FELA. By settling on the zone-of-danger
test, the Court put to rest the more creative and practical Third
Circuit "genuineness" test and the even more sensible full recov-
ery rule.
Terrence M. Lewis
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